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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, EXECUTION
PUBLICITY AND MURDER IN HOUSTON,
TEXAS
LISA STOLZENBERG & STEWART J. D'ALESSIO*
Punishment is not inflicted by a rational man for the sake of the crime that has
been committed-after all one cannot undo what is past-butfor the sake of the
future, to prevent either the same man or, by the spectacle of his punishment,
someone else, from doing wrong again.

- Plato, Protagoras

I. INTRODUCTION
Healthy debate persists as to the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
Although an expansive and diverse body of research has accumulated that
examines the effect of executions or execution publicity on murder rates,
this research affords few definitive conclusions. On one hand, there is
evidence that executions reduce murder levels. Empirical work by Ehrlich,
Phillips, and Stack supports this view.' On the other hand, several studies
fail to discern convincing evidence of a relationship.2 Still others find a
positive association.'
These inconsistencies in the literature raise
. Both Associate Professors of Criminal Justice, School of Policy and Management,
Florida International University.
1 Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 Am.ECON. REv. 397 (1975); David P. Phillips, The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. J. Soc. 139 (1980); Steven
Stack, Publicized Executions and Homicide, 1950-1980, 52 AM. Soc. REv. 532 (1987).
2 William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder and Capital Punishment: A Monthly
Time-Series Analysis of Execution Publicity, 54 AM. Soc. REv. 722 (1989); William C.
Bailey, Murder, Capital Punishment, and Television: Execution Publicity and Homicide
Rates, 55 AM. Soc. REV. 628 (1990) [hereinafter Bailey, Television: Execution Publicity];
Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Felony Murder and Capital Punishment: An
Examination of the Deterrence Question, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 367 (1991).
3 John K. Cochran et al., Deterrence or Brutalization? An Impact Assessment of
Oklahoma's Return to Capital Punishment, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 107 (1994); David R. King,
The Brutalization Effect: Execution Publicity and the Incidence of Homicide in South
Carolina,57 Soc. FORCES 683 (1978).
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methodological issues, some of which are grounded in theoretical
arguments. Perhaps the most serious concern is specifying the true nature
of the causal relationship between capital punishment and murder rates.
Most previous studies estimated only unidirectional relationships. The
question of salience, however, is whether recursive models portray the
relations among the variables of interest accurately. Another issue relates to
the geographical unit of analysis best suited for evincing deterrence effects.
Whereas most prior studies relied on state or national level data to assess
the deterrent effect of capital punishment, a high level of aggregation may
not fully capture the ecological dynamics that are hypothesized to underlie
deterrence theory.
We address these methodological concerns to help clarify the
conflicting findings often reported in the literature. Using monthly data and
a fully recursive vector ARMA statistical procedure, we examine the causal
relations among execution risk, execution newspaper publicity, and
incidents of murder in Houston, Texas from January 1990 to December
1994. We address three general questions. First, does the number of
monthly executions decrease murder incidents? If people are rational actors
who weigh the likely costs and benefits of their behavior before engaging in
criminal activity as deterrence advocates suggest, an inverse relationship
between execution risk and murder incidents is anticipated. Conversely, if
the brutalization thesis has any merit, we expect to observe a positive
relationship between execution risk and murder incidents. Second, does
variation in murder incidents impact execution risk? It is plausible that
high levels of murder drain the finite resources of the criminal justice
system, thereby making the apprehension, prosecution, and execution of
offenders less certain. It is also possible that high murder rates amplify
public fear of crime, which in turn evokes a more punitive response on the
part of prosecutors and judges in their handling of criminal cases. Third, if
causality flows in both directions, what is the relative magnitude of the
effects of execution risk on murder incidents and murder incidents on
execution risk?
In addition to analyzing the relationship between execution risk and
murder incidents, an effort is made to determine whether the newspaper
publicity surrounding an execution affects the frequency of murder
incidents. Because deterrence is a communicative theory, it seems logical
to anticipate that such publicity influences murder rates. The identification
of the nature and direction of the causal relations among execution risk,
execution newspaper publicity, and murder incidents should help to enrich
our understanding of deterrence theory.
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A. BACKGROUND

The deterrent effect of capital punishment remains a topic of
contentious debate. Advocates of the deterrence thesis maintain that the
death penalty acts as an effective deterrent because individuals are free-will
actors who rationally weigh the probable benefits and potential liabilities
before engaging in criminal activities. This calculation on the part of the
individual hinges on personal experience with criminal punishment,
knowledge of what sanctions are imposed by law, and awareness of how
4
punishment has been applied to apprehended offenders in the past.

The

state's administering of capital punishment must also be swift and certain if
a reduction in crime is to be actualized. Another important facet of the
deterrence theory is that the threat of punishment must be communicated to
the populace. The state's sanctioning of criminal offenders serves as an
example to those who have not yet committed a crime, instilling in them
sufficient fear to deter them from partaking in illegal activities.
Advocates of deterrence remain steadfast in their belief that the crime
of murder is a product of a reasoned decision-making process on the part of
an individual. A number of empirical studies give credence to this belief.
Felson and Messner find that a sizable percentage of murders in our society
result from an offender's desire to avoid retaliation from others or to
eliminate potential witnesses.5 Parker also reports that even alcohol-related
murders are not irrationally motivated.6 Even serial killers, usually
considered among the most irrational of all offenders, appear to select their
victims from either the defenseless or from those unable to depend fully on
law enforcement for protection, such as prostitutes and the homeless.'
However, despite the plausibility of the deterrence thesis, many social
scientists are still unconvinced that capital punishment deters people from
committing murder. The threat of the death penalty, especially when the
likelihood of execution is extremely small, is not seen as having the same
motivating power as the offender's desires at the moment of the crime.
Most murderers, for example, are thought to lack single-minded intent.8
The death or survival of a victim in a homicidal attack is believed to be
4 The publicity surrounding an execution may also serve an educative, moralizing, and
normative validation function. See JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE
(1975).
5 Richard B. Felson & Steven F. Messner, To Kill or Not to Kill? Lethal Outcomes in
Injurious Attacks, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 519 (1996).
6 ROBERT NASH PARKER, ALCOHOL AND HOMICIDE (1995).
7 ERIC W. HICKEY, SERIAL MURDERERS AND THEIR VICTIMS (1991).
8 ROBERT M. BOHM, DEATHQUEST: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1999).
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largely a matter of chance, and that chance depends to a degree on the
lethality of the weapon used to inflict the injury. Studies also show that
most murderers have little or no prior criminal records 9 and that murderers
released from prison recidivate at lower rates than other felony offenders.1 0
Some also argue that executions escalate violence levels in society by
devaluing human life and by legitimizing lethal violence. Two main
variants of this argument have been adduced in the literature. One focuses
on the desensitizing aspects associated with repeated exposure to violence,
while the other centers on the modeling of violent behavior. First,
according to Bandura," repeated exposure to either direct or indirect
violence has a desensitizing effect on individuals. Bandura's claim is
consistent with experimental studies showing that frequent exposure to
violence not only results in a gradual blunting of emotional responses to
subsequent displays of aggression 2 but also reduces the speed and
willingness of an individual to intervene in the violent disputes of others. 3
A second perspective maintains that individuals learn aggressive
behavior by observing the aggressive behavior of others. For example,
research has found that homicides increase markedly shortly after14
championship prize fights given widespread media coverage of the events.
Additionally, the publicity surrounding suicides has been found to be
associated with subsequent rises in suicide rates.'5 The clear implication of
these studies is that heavy exposure to publicity surrounding executions
may desensitize people or may provide them with violent models to imitate,
and in turn, raise the probability of violent behavior, including murder.
B. PRIOR RESEARCH
Despite considerable support for the deterrence theory at both the
macro and micro levels of analysis, 16 empirical evidence for the expectation
9 ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL (1995).
10 Gennaro F. Vito & Deborah G. Wilson, Back from the Dead: Tracking the Progressof

Kentucky's Furman-CommutedDeath Row Population,5 JUST. Q. 101 (1988).

11ALBERT BANDURA,

AGGRESSION: A SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS (1973).
12 Margaret Hanratty Thomas et al., Desensitizationto Portrayalsof Real-life Aggression

as a Function of Exposure to Television Violence, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 450
(1977).
13 Ronald S. Drabman & Margaret Hanratty Thomas, Does Media Violence Increase
Children's Tolerance of Real-life Aggression?, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 418 (1974).
14 David P. Phillips, The Impact of Mass Media Violence on U.S. Homicides, 48 AM.

Soc. REv. 560 (1983).
15Kenneth A. Bollen & David P. Phillips, Imitative Suicides: A National Study of the
Effects of Television News Stories, 47 AM. SOC. REv. 802 (1982).
16 CHARLES

R.

TITTLE,

SANCTIONS

AND

SOCIAL

DEVIANCE:

THE

QUESTION

OF
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that capital punishment reduces murder rates in society has not been
compelling. It is beyond the scope of this paper to comment on all previous
research in detail. However, prior studies have enough commonality that a
general discussion of several examples is sufficient.17
Ehrlich examined national execution and homicide data for various
periods between 1933 and 1969 and found a significant negative
relationship between execution rates and homicide rates after controlling for
a variety of factors.' 8 His analysis led him to conclude that an additional
execution per year over the period in question resulted, on average, in seven
or eight fewer murders. Phillips examined the deterrent effect of twentytwo highly publicized executions in London, England from 1858 to 1921.19
He found a thirty-five percent decline in the average number of homicides
during the two weeks immediately following each execution. However,
this deterrent effect was short-lived because the number of homicides
returned to baseline levels during the third, fourth, and fifth weeks
following the executions. Stack used data for the United States from 1950
to 1980 to examine the deterrent effect of newspaper coverage devoted to
executions. 20 He classified executions recorded in Facts on File and The
New York Times as receiving high levels of newspaper publicity.
Executions appearing in The New York Times but not in Facts on File were
coded as receiving moderate media attention. Executions not covered in
either source were classified as low-publicity cases. Stack observed a
reduction in homicide rates for months with highly publicized executions.
In contrast, there was little association between executions receiving
moderate or low publicity and homicide rates. Over the entire period of
observation, Stack estimated that an average of thirty people were saved for
every execution carried out by the state.
Bailey investigated the relationship between monthly murder rates and
national evening news coverage devoted to executions from 1976 to 1987.21
He employed the amount of news coverage dedicated to each execution, as
well as the type of news coverage. Type of news coverage encompassed
qualitative factors such as whether the executed offender maintained his or
her innocence and whether the offender was executed for killing a child.
DETERRENCE (1980).
17

For a more detailed and comprehensive review of the literature, see Steven Stack,

Publicized Executions and the Incidence of Homicide: Methodological Sources of
Inconsistent Findings, in HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 355 (M. A.
DuPont-Morales et al. eds., 2001).
I8 See Ehrlich, supra note 1.
19See Phillips, supra note 1.
20 See Stack, supra note I.
21 See Bailey, Television: Execution Publicity, supra note 2.
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Bailey observed only a chance association between the number of monthly
executions and homicide rates. The type of news coverage also failed to
play a salient role in determining monthly homicide rates. Grogger
analyzed daily homicide data drawn from death certificates for California
during the 1960s.22 He disaggregated the homicide data by the victim's
race and gender. His analysis of the data showed little support for the
deterrence argument.
King investigated the effect of twenty publicized executions in South
Carolina that occurred between 1951-1962.23 Contrary to the deterrence
thesis, he found that there was an overall increase of 1.2 homicides
following an execution. Cochran et al. also found support for the
brutalization thesis.2 4 Using an interrupted time-series design, he and his
associates attempted to discern the impact of the execution of Charles
Coleman, who was the first person executed in Oklahoma following a
twenty-five-year moratorium of executions in the state. They found an
increase in stranger homicides following the Coleman execution. Cochran
et al. concluded that, "[b]ecause social ties and hence social controls
possibly are much weaker among strangers, such affronts, particularly if
they follow an execution, could result in somebody's [sic] being killed." 25
C. METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS WITH PRIOR RESEARCH
Although considerable effort has been devoted to evaluating the
deterrent effect of capital punishment, most analyses are plagued with
methodological problems. Research on the deterrent effect of capital
punishment has "suffered from a lack of high quality data, and to a
somewhat lesser extent from the use of weak or inappropriate statistical
techniques to analyze what data do exist.' '26 One problem relates to a
general failure among social scientists to account for the possibility that the
linkage between execution risk and murder rates is reciprocal.27 There are
convincing theoretical expectations for such a causal relationship. For
example, it is proffered that organizational efficiency is related to

Jeffery Grogger, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Analysis of Daily
Homicide Counts, 85 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 295 (1990).
23 See King, supra note 3.
24 See Cochran et al., supra note 3.
22

25

Id.at 110.

26

See Grogger, supra note 22, at 295.

27 THE

NAT'L

RESEARCH

COUNCIL,

NAT'L

ACAD.

OF

Sci.,

DETERRENCE

AND

INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES

(Alfred Blumstein et al.
eds., 1978).
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workload. 28 Adherents to this view maintain that because criminal justice
resources tend to be relatively inelastic, at least in the short term, a rise in
murder rates may actually lower the probability of an execution following
the commission of a murder. As Hoenack and Weiler write, "increases in
murders augment workloads in the criminal justice system which, in the
absence of additional resources, result in lower levels of the measured rates
of apprehension of suspects, conviction of apprehended suspects, and
execution of convicted criminals. 2 9 The potential for finding an overload
effect is particularly relevant to death penalty research because most states
with capital punishment statutes allow condemned defendants to appeal
their cases directly to the highest appellate court immediately following
their conviction. These appellate courts are also required to review habeas
corpus appeals from individuals already on death row who are awaiting
sentencing. It seems entirely plausible that these direct appeals overwhelm
the court's ability to expedite habeas corpus applications in capital cases,
thereby decreasing the likelihood of execution.
Figure 1 shows some evidence for this assertion. This figure displays
the number of executions by the number of murder and non-negligent
homicides that occurred in the United States from 1977 to 2001. A visual
examination of the graphic shows that during years when the number of
murders is relatively low, executions are most likely to occur.
On the other hand, public choice theory argues that high murder rates
increase public fear, which in turn makes prosecutors more likely to seek
the death penalty and judges less apt to reverse a death penalty judgment.30
As Coyne and Entzeroth note, "[t]he death penalty and politics . . . are

inseparable," particularly because "the vast majority of judges who preside
over capital cases must answer to the electorate . . . ,,31 Given the
plausibility of these explanations, a compelling theoretical rationale exists
for expecting that murder levels, at least to some degree, influence the risk
of execution.

28

Michael Geerken & Walter R. Gove, Deterrence, Overload and Incapacitation. An

EmpiricalEvaluation, 56 Soc. FORCES 424 (1977).
29 Stephen A. Hoenack & William C. Weiler, A Structural Model of Murder Behavior
and the CriminalJustice System, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 327, 328 (1980).
30 Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding
Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759
(1995).
31 Randall Coyne & Lyn Entzeroth, Report RegardingImplementation of the American
Bar Association's Recommendations and Resolutions Concerning the Death Penalty and
Callingfor a Moratoriumon Executions, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 13 (1996).
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Figure I
Executions by Murder and Nonnegligent Homicides in the United States
1977-2001
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Note: The murder and nonnegligent homicides that occurred as a result of the events of September 11,2001 are not
included.
Sources: FBI, Uniform Crime Reports, prepared bythe National Archive of Criminal Justice Data; BJS, Capital
Punishment, 2001.

Differences in causal mechanisms aside, these predictions provide a
more complex view of the relationship between execution risk and murder
rates than deterrence theory predicts. Even so, the vast majority of studies
conducted to date restrict their attention to recursive models that allow for
an execution-murder effect, but that preclude the prospect of murder levels
also influencing execution risk. This problem is by no means picayune.
Specification error of this type not only misrepresents the relationships
directly involved but also biases the coefficients that are being estimated.
This specification problem alone has hindered attempts to estimate the
execution-murder linkage in previous empirical work.
However, while most studies have ignored the possibility of reciprocal
effects between executions and murder rates, some investigators have been
mindful of potential causality problems. Two basic research strategies have
been employed to model possible simultaneous effects. The first approach
relies on two-stage least squares regression to differentiate the potential
effect of execution risk on murder and murder on execution risk.32
However, the identification assumptions made in these studies are
somewhat questionable. The major problem relates to the selection of
instruments that are necessary to identify each nonrecursive relationship.
32

See Ehrlich, supra note 1;Hoenack & Weiler, supra note 29.
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Two-stage least squares estimates are dependent on the instruments selected
and there is often an array of nearly equally plausible candidates.
Unfortunately, neither research nor theory provides much guidance
regarding the selection criteria that researchers should employ.
The second approach allows the data to aid in the determination of the
appropriate lag structure between execution risk and murder rates. Many
researchers have used statistical procedures such as ordinary least squares
regression, panel regression, or ARIMA to assess the deterrent effect of
capital punishment. But, these statistical procedures do not allow for the
estimation of feedback relationships. They are predicated solely on the
assumption that temporal sequencing provides a sufficient basis for making
inferences about causal order. Even if we were to accept the theoretical
rationale of a delayed effect of execution risk on murder levels, the lagging
of a variable does not necessarily eliminate the problem of simultaneity
bias.33 Because many previous analyses only tested for lagged execution
risk effects, it is questionable whether findings generated from these types
of studies represent the true nature of the relationship between capital
punishment and murder rates.
Another methodological shortcoming pertains to the geographical unit
of analysis generally used in research. Despite some recent exceptions,34
most prior analyses relied on state or national level data to access the
deterrent effect of capital punishment. While these studies have made
important contributions to the literature, a high level of aggregation may not
fully capture the ecological dynamics that are hypothesized to underlie
deterrence theory. It seems logical to assume that potential criminal actors,
if influenced at all, respond to the threat of punishment within small
ecological units such as cities since these units tend to be more
homogeneous in reference to punishment risk. 5
It is also important to recognize that for executions to effectuate a
reduction in murder rates, the public must be conscious of each execution.
The dissemination of information regarding changes in execution risk is
also likely to be enhanced by the properties of small ecological units. Many
investigations that assessed the effect of execution publicity on murder rates
relied on national-level media outlets such as The New York Times, Facts

33

Glenn Firebaugh & Frank D. Beck, Does Economic Growth Benefit the Masses?

Growth, Dependence, and Welfare in the Third World, 59 AM. Soc. REv. 631 (1994).
34 William C. Bailey, Disaggregationin Deterrence and Death Penalty Research: The
Case of Murder in Chicago, 74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827 (1984); see also Phillips,
supra note 1.
35 David F. Greenberg et al., Aggregation Bias in Deterrence Research: An Empirical
Analysis, 18 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 128 (1981).
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on File, or on national television news broadcasts to measure execution
publicity. Yet, only a small fraction of executions garner national media
attention. For example, Stack found that Facts on File reported less than
five execution news stories between the years of 1948-1960, despite the
occurrence of more than fifty executions per year during this time period.36
Additionally, Peterson and Bailey reported that only twenty-five of ninetythree executions transpiring between 1976-1987 in the U.S. received any
national evening news media exposure. 37 In contrast, most news coverage
of executions tends to be concentrated locally. From 1990 to 1994, for
example, fifty-two individuals were executed in Texas. The Houston
Chronicle,a widely read local newspaper in the city of Houston, referenced
all fifty-two executions on one or more occasions.
Moreover, the readership of a local newspaper such as the Houston
Chronicle is proportionally greater than the readership of a national paper
such as The New York Times. In 1999, The New York Times had a
readership of approximately 1.6 million people nationally. In contrast, the
Houston Chronicle had a readership of about 740,000 people. Thus, while
about forty percent of the population in Houston might become aware of an
execution by reading the Houston Chronicle, less than one percent of the
population nationally may become aware of an execution by reading The
New York Times. In sum, because local news editors and news broadcasters
devote higher proportions of their coverage to executions that occur locally,
a much higher percentage of the local population, including potential
murderers, are going to be made aware of an execution. As Stack writes,
"[g]iven the relative lack of national publicity for most executions, the use
of local or state data might reduce measurement errors. 38
It is also important to note that individuals fashion their perceptions of
punishment risk not only on the basis of media outlets, but also through
their friends, coworkers, and neighbors. Person-to-person communication
tends to be the primary source of information for most people rather than
newspapers, radio, or television. 39 Additionally, these friendship networks
are likely to be circumscribed by small geographical boundaries.4 ° In sum,
then, valid tests of the deterrent effect of capital punishment necessitate a
36

Steven Stack, Execution Publicity and Homicide in South Carolina:A Research Note,

31 Soc. Q. 599, 608 n.I (1990).
37 See Peterson & Bailey, supra note 2, at 374.
38 See Stack, supra note 36, at 600.
39 Melvin L. DeFleur & Mary M. Cronin, Completeness and Accuracy of Recall in the
Diffusion of the News from a Newspaper vs. a Television Source, 61 SOC. INQUIRY 148, 149
(1991).
40 CLAUDE S. FISCHER, To DWELL AMONG FRIENDS: PERSONAL NETWORKS IN TOWN AND
CITY

(1982).
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unit of analysis that is small enough to accurately reflect the tenets of
deterrence theory. Units sufficiently small so that information regarding
changes in punishment risk can be disseminated easily among the populace,
at least in terms of geographical proximity, are preferred.
A third criticism involves the inclusion of offenders in homicide data
who are not eligible to receive the death penalty because of their age. Most
previous analyses used homicide data drawn from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR). The use of
this data is problematic in at least two respects. First, because data are
submitted by law enforcement agencies to the FBI at early stages of murder
investigations, offender characteristic information such as age is frequently
niissing.4 1 Age is important because it determines whether an offender is
eligible to receive the death penalty.4 ' Even more troublesome for national
level studies is that age eligibility for the death penalty varies by state.
In addition, the SHR only contain information relating to the date of
the victim's death. This is problematic because some victim deaths result
from injuries inflicted days, weeks, or even months after the homicidal
attack occurred.43 To illustrate, if a victim receives a gunshot wound during
a robbery in January but he survives in the hospital until February, the SHR
records the date of the homicide as occurring in February rather than in
January. In any analysis of the deterrent effect of capital punishment it
seems advisable for researchers to use the date that the fatal attack occurred
rather than the date that the victim died since these two dates might be
different.
II. DATA AND METHODS
The purpose of this study is to shed additional light on the debate
regarding the deterrent effect of capital punishment, correcting for many of
the methodological problems encountered in earlier studies. We contribute
to the extant literature by using monthly data and a fully recursive vector
ARMA statistical procedure to examine the relations among execution risk,
newspaper execution publicity, and murder incidents in Houston, Texas.
Our study period is from 1990 to 1994. The type of data and the analytic

41

Fred C. Pampel & Kirk R. Williams, Intimacy and Homicide: Compensating for

Missing Data in the SHR, 38
42

CRIMINOLOGY

661, 662 (2000).

Juveniles currently account for a large percentage of the murders committed in the

United States. About twelve percent of all individuals arrested for murder are under the age
of eighteen. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 1998 (1999), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_98/98crime/
98cius01 .pdf.
43 Donald D. Trunkey, Trauma, 249 Sci. AM. 28 (1983).
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strategy used in this study have obvious methodological advantages over
previous research in this area. First, although no research design guarantees
correct inferences, the vector ARMA statistical procedure affords us the
opportunity to assess contemporaneous and lagged relationships and to
directly test for feedback effects. The ability to estimate such a model is
important because, as previously discussed, there is strong reason to
speculate that the relationship between execution risk and murder is
reciprocal.
Second, we use city as our geographic unit of analysis because it is an
aggregation large enough to allow for a sufficient range of variation in
murder incidents, but at the same time small enough to be relatively
homogenous in regard to punishment risk. The city of Houston algo
provides an important venue for this study because proponents of
deterrence have long argued that the death penalty must be administered in
44
a swift, certain, and frequent manner to effectuate a reduction in murder.
Harris County, which includes Houston, is responsible for more death
sentences and executions than any other county in America. 45 Executions
also occur in Texas with greater certainty than in most other death penalty
states. Between 1973 and 1995, fifteen percent of the death sentences were
carried out in Texas.46 This figure was the fifth highest in the U.S. during
this time period. Texas also ranked fourth nationally in the number of
executions per homicide and fifth in the number of death sentences per
homicide.
A. MURDER INCIDENTS
Our analysis is concerned with murder incidents, as opposed to the
murder rate or the raw number of murders.47 Murder is defined as the
willful (non-negligent) killing of one human being by another. Excluded
from the murder incident variable are negligent manslaughters, accidental
homicides, justifiable homicides and executions carried out by the state.
Although the murder rate and the raw number of murders have been
employed in the past by researchers, their construction ignores the fact that
a deterrent effect is only anticipated for the first murder in a murder
incident. If an individual can receive the death penalty for killing a single
person in a murder incident, there is no logical reason to expect that an
4 ERNEST VAN DEN HAAG & JOHN CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE

(1983).

Tamar Lewin, Who Decides Who Will Die? Even Within States It Varies, N.Y.
Feb. 23, 1995, at Al.
15

46 JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR RATES IN CAPITAL CASES,

1995 (2000).
47 See Bailey & Peterson, supra note 2.

TIMES,

1973-
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offender will be deterred from killing additional individuals in the same
incident. We also excluded all murders where the identified offender was
sixteen or younger because murderers under the age of seventeen cannot be
sentenced to death in Texas. Our murder incident variable also represents
the date that the fatal attack occurred and not the date that the victim died.
The Houston Police Department furnished the data on murder incidents.
These data are useful for our purposes because they were updated routinely
by the Houston Police Department.48
It is argued by some social scientists that the appropriate dependent
variable in a study of the deterrent effect of capital punishment should be
those homicides legally defined as capital murders. This line of reasoning
hinges on the assumption that deterrence requires a conscious and deliberate
weighing of risks on the part of the offender. However, it is debatable as to
whether the deterrent effects of the death penalty are limited solely to
homicides legally defined as punishable by death. The cognitive link in
potential offenders' minds may be between the ultimate legal sanction,
death, and the act of homicide rather than any particular arbitrary legal
subtype of homicide. As Kleck points out, "there is no reason to limit the
hypothesized effect of deterrence variables to premeditated homicides only
since preventative effects of legal sanctions do not necessarily depend on
any deliberate, conscious consideration of potential punishments by
potential offenders., 49 We assume, like most previous researchers that the
ratio of first-degree murder to murder in general is constant, so that the
latter furnishes a reasonably good indicator of capital offenses. 50

48

Unfortunately, the Houston Police Department discontinued collecting these data at

the end of 1994.
49 Gary Kleck, CapitalPunishment, Gun Ownership, and Homicide, 84 Am.J. Soc. 882,
888 n.5 (1979).
50 See Bailey, Television: Execution Publicity, supra note 2; Bailey & Peterson, supra
note 2; Stack, supra note I. Although the concept of capital murder is considered
"ambiguous" because the entire criminal justice process determines whether a capital crime
has been committed, see Stephen A. Hoenack et al., The Deterrent Effect of Capital
Punishment: A Question of Identification, 4 POL'y ANALYSIS 491, 506 (1978), a few
researchers have attempted to identify capital murders on the basis of homicide circumstance
information contained in the Supplemental Homicide Reports. See Bailey & Peterson, supra
note 2. However, as previously discussed, homicide circumstance information is frequently
missing in the Supplemental Homicide Reports. As a consequence, researchers have
assumed that homicides with missing circumstance information are actually felony murders.
Felony murders are considered capital crimes in most states. However, this arbitrary
classification of missing circumstance information reportedly produces a distorted image of
lethal violence and introduces an unknown degree of bias in a statistical analysis. See
Pampel & Williams, supra note 41, at 662.
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B. EXECUTION RISK
We employ frequency of execution as our measure of execution risk
because it is more likely that a potential offender is sensitive to the relative
frequency of execution rather than to the marginal probability of execution.
The state of Texas carried out fifty-two executions during the study period.
Many previous studies measured execution risk as a ratio (i.e., the number
of executions divided by the number of murders reported to police). The
use of this measure assumes that peoples' perceptions of the certainty of
capital punishment derive from a calculation of the number of murders
relative to the number of executions. However, the frequency of execution
is considered a more theoretically appropriate measure for testing the
deterrence thesis because most people do not have accurate knowledge
regarding the actual amount of criminal activity in their neighborhoods.5'
Rather, most people only perceive the level of murder in their community in
very broad terms. This is especially true in large communities where
murders tend to be more commonplace. If the public is misinformed about
the actual number of murders in their community, then a ratio measure of
execution risk may not reflect the public's true perception of the deterrent
effect of capital punishment.
C. EXECUTION NEWSPAPER PUBLICITY

On theoretical grounds it seems reasonable to assume that the deterrent
effect of capital punishment is dependent on the amount of publicity given
to an execution. The more citizens become aware of an execution, the
greater the likelihood of a deterrent effect. We measure the amount of
media attention devoted to executions as the level of print coverage
52
contained in the Houston Chronicle.
The Houston Chronicle is the
newspaper of record for Houston and has the largest circulation of any daily
newspaper in the city. It is postulated that an execution story covered by
51
52

See VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 44.
Although newspaper execution publicity is widely used by researchers and newspapers

are considered "well suited for the study of city or state areas," see Bollen & Phillips, supra
note 15, at 803, some maintain that television news broadcasts are a better measure of
execution publicity because they are a major source of news for many Americans. See
Bailey, Television: Execution Publicity,supra note 2. We feel that this position is overstated
for two reasons. First, investigations regarding recall patterns from different news mediums
have generally shown print media to be superior to television in terms of message retention.
See DeFleur & Cronin, supra note 39, at 164. Second, and more importantly, very few
executions receive coverage on national evening news television broadcasts. See Bailey &
Peterson, supra note 2. We did consider using local television news broadcasts, but there is
no index or abstract available to measure the amount of news coverage devoted to executions
during the 1990-1994 time period.
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the Houston Chronicle received wide publicity and that executions not
covered by the newspaper garnered little or no publicity. Archives of the
Houston Chronicleare available online.
We measure newspaper execution coverage as the product of the
monthly number of newspaper execution stories multiplied by the number
of newspaper execution story lines per month. Our first measure is the
monthly count of execution stories appearing in the Houston Chronicle.
Between January 1990 and December 1994, the Houston Chronicle
published 237 stories relating to executions in Texas. Our coding scheme
pertains only to execution publicity. Publicity regarding other aspects of
capital cases such as appeals of capital convictions or stays of execution is
not considered in the analysis. Our second publicity measure is the total
number of execution story lines published per month. We employ this
measure because some stories relating to executions are much longer in
length than other execution stories. The average number of execution story
lines per month is 36.48. The means, standard deviations, sums, and
definitions for the variables used in this study are reported in Table 1.
These variables are also depicted graphically over the time period of the
study in Figures 2 and 3.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics andD initionsforthe Variables, 1990-1994
Variable

Murder
Murder
Incidents

Mean

S.D.

Sum

36.55

9.06

2193

Executions
Execution
Etion
stories

.87

.96

52

3.95

4.65

237

Execution
story length

36.48

46.81

2189

Execution
publicity

341.45

775.04

20,487

Definition

Number of monthly murder and
non-negligent manslaughter
incidents committed in Houston.
Number of death row inmates
executed monthly in Texas.
Number of monthly execution
stories reported in the Houston
Chronicle.
Number of monthly execution
story lines reported in the Houston
Chronicle.
Number of execution stories
multiplied by execution story
p length.

366

LISA STOLZENBERG & STEWARTJ. D 'ALESSIO

[Vol. 94

Figure 2
Statewide Executions and Murder Incidents in Houston, Texas
January 1990 - December 1994
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Figure 3
Execution Publicity and Murder Incidents in Houston, Texas
January 1990 - December 1994
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Note: The publicity levels shown for July and August 1993 were exceedingly high because two brothers were
executed in July. (Danny and Curtis Harris). and five executions occured in August.
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D. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
We used vector ARMA to estimate the relations among execution risk,
execution newspaper publicity and murder incidents. Although primarily
employed by statisticians and economists, vector ARMA has been
53
employed by a few sociologists to examine trends in school victimization
and to investigate the relationship between alcohol treatment and cirrhosis
mortality. 4 Vector ARMA is a fully recursive statistical procedure, which
allows us to test for contemporaneous, lagged, and feedback relationships
among two or more variables. A vector ARMA model can be conceived of
as a set of reduced-form equations associated with a simultaneous system of
linear structural equations. The vector ARMA statistical procedure is
unique in that it does not necessitate an a priori specification of the
direction of causality or the lag structure among the variables of interest.
Formally, the vector ARMA model is described as: 4i(B)Zt= 0(B)E,
where
is a matrix of autoregressive parameters, 0 is a matrix of movingaverage parameters, Z t is a stationary vector of time series containing n
observations, and et is a vector of random shocks which are independently,
identically, and normally distributed with a zero mean and stable variance.
The vector ARMA approach is a relatively straightforward extension
of the univariate and bivariate Box-Jenkins analytic methodology in that it
uses an interative modeling procedure to determine model specification.
That is, each time series is treated as vector or group of series for which a
common noise model is identified, estimated, and evaluated through various
diagnostic tests. Once a common noise model is specified, specific
hypotheses concerning the relationships among the series can be specified
with the common knowledge that common trends, seasonal patterns, and
other spurious components which exist across the vector of series have been
controlled for. The methodology for constructing a vector ARMA model
consists of three stages: (1) tentative model specification, where sample
cross-correlation and partial cross-correlation matrices are used to specify
the order of the vector ARMA process; (2) estimation, where efficient
parameter estimates are obtained by maximizing the likelihood function;
and (3) diagnostic checking, where model deficiencies are identified by a
cross-correlation analysis of the residual series.
The residual crosscorrelation matrices should represent a random white-noise process, as
determined by chi-square statistics.
53 See Robert Nash Parker et al., Trends in Victimization in Schools and Elsewhere,
1974-1981, 7 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1991).
54 See Harold D. Holder & Robert Nash Parker, Effect of Alcoholism Treatment on
Cirrhosis Mortality: A 20-year Multivariate Time Series Analysis, 87 BRIT. J. ADDICTION

1263 (1992).
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To estimate our models, we employed the MTS software package from
Automatic Forecasting Systems.5 5 The identification routine in MTS
computes and plots sample autocorrelation matrices and a partial lag
correlation matrix. These matrices enable us to identify the appropriate AR
and MA orders. In a vector ARMA (p, q) model, p is the number of
autoregressive parameters, and q is the number of moving-average
parameters. Once the model is identified, the MTS program uses a moment
estimation routine (conditional least squares) to estimate the maximumlikelihood parameters. 6 If the estimated model fits well, the residual
autocorrelations for the model will be small 'and weakly related.57
The relations among the variables of interest are assessed in the
following manner. First, if the matrices for j(B) and 0(B) are lower
triangular, it suggests that the variables in the model are not related causally
in the sense of Granger. 8 Second, if the matrices for *(B) and 0(B) are
block triangular, it indicates the existence of a unidirectional relationship.
Finally, if an off-diagonal value in the error correlation matrix (Z) is
statistically significant, it indicates a contemporaneous relationship between
two variables at the zero-lag.

III. RESULTS
Table 2 reports the maximum-likelihood estimates for a vector ARMA
(2, 0) model. The residuals for this specification satisfy all the diagnostic
requirements recommended by Tiao and Box to ensure model adequacy.59
Several interesting findings emerge from a visual inspection of this table.
First, although deterrence theory posits that execution risk is an important
factor in reducing murder levels, our findings undermine this assumption.
We find no empirical evidence that frequency of execution influences
murder incidents in the negative direction 0, (1, 2) = 0. Additionally, and
contrary to predictions derived from the brutalization thesis, this
insignificant coefficient fails to lend credence to the importance of
executions as a factor in escalating murder incidents. Table 2 shows that
the most salient predictor of current murder incident levels is past levels

55 MTS USER'S GUIDE (Version 2, Nov. 1987) (on file with author).
56

See Henrik Spliid, A Fast Estimation Method for the Vector Autoregressive Moving

Average Model with Exogenous Variables, 78 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N 843 (1983).
57 See G. C. Tiao & G. E. P. Box, Modeling Multiple Time Series with Applications,
76 J.
Am. STAT. ASS'N 802 (1981).
58 See C. W. J. Granger, Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and
Cross-SpectralMethods, 37 ECONOMETRICA 424 (1969).
59 See Tiao & Box, supra note 57. We also estimated differenced models, but the
undifferenced models produced more parsimonious results.
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2(1,
1) = .570. An examination of the error correlation matrix (Y)
reveals no evidence of a contemporaneous association between execution
risk and murder incidents.

Table 2
Vector Arma Estimates of the Relationship Between MurderIncidents and
Executions, 1990-1994*
E xlO
0,2
Murders

Murders

Executions

-.030
(-2.22)

Executions

1[
_j

Murders

.570

Executions

Murders

Executions

-1.296

.842

1F53.7611
I

I

*1score in parentheses. The results are presented in matrix form. The significant coefficient in the (2,
1) position indicates that murder incidents influence executions at lag-I. If the coefficient in the (1, 2)
position had been statistically significant, it would indicate that executions affect murder incidents at
lag-1. If the coefficients in the (2, 1) position and the (1, 2) were both significant, it would indicate
that there was feedback between executions and murder incidents at lag-I. Because vector ARMA
uses an iterative process to derive parameter estimates, only the significant coefficients are reported in
the final model.

Of particular salience is the negative and statistically significant
delayed and sustained effect of murder incidents on execution risk q5, (2, 1)
= -.030, which is reported in Table 2. As the number of murder incidents in
Houston rises, the number of executions in Texas decreases substantially
the following month and to a lesser extent each month thereafter. This
finding furnishes support for the overload hypothesis. To facilitate further
interpretation of this relationship, we constructed a chart that depicts the
monthly number of executions in Texas by the monthly number of murder
incidents in Houston for the five-year period. Figure 4 is intuitively
appealing because it portrays the operation of the causal mechanisms
associated with the overload thesis. During months when the number of
murder incidents in Houston was relatively low, the number of executions
carried out by the state was at its highest level. It is not that surprising that
monthly murder incidents in Houston are driving executions at the state
level when one considers that approximately forty-eight percent of the
offenders executed in Texas during the observation period were sentenced
to death in Houston.
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Figure 4
Statewide Executions by Murder Incidents in Houston, Texas
January 1990 -December 1994
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We turn next to the question of execution publicity effects since the
vector ARMA results displayed in Table 2 are by themselves insufficient to
falsify the deterrence thesis. It may be that the publicity surrounding an
execution, rather than the execution itself, is salient in predicting changes in
the number of monthly murder incidents. We estimated a model measuring
execution publicity as the product of the monthly number of newspaper
execution stories multiplied by the number of newspaper execution story
lines per month. We excluded the execution risk variable from this model
because it was highly correlated with the execution publicity measure (r =
.659). This high correlation is interesting because previous studies reported
extremely small correlations between execution publicity and execution risk
nationally. Our finding of a high correlation between execution risk and the
execution newspaper publicity measure suggests strongly in favor of using
data from local rather than from national sources when attempting to
measure execution publicity.
The results presented in Table 3 indicate that execution publicity is
unrelated to the frequency of murder incidents. Murder incidents also fail
to have a direct influence on newspaper publicity. The most salient
predictors of current levels of execution publicity and murder incidents are
past levels of these variables. Although some research has found that
newspaper publicity is important for understanding variations in murder
levels, our analysis undermines this assumption. The residual correlations
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at the zero-lag between the newspaper publicity measure and murder
incidents are also not of substantive importance.6"
Table 3
Vector Arma Estimates of the RelationshipBetween Murder Incidents and
Execution Publicity1990-1994*
Z x 10
02z
01
Murders

Publicity

.570

Murders

Publicity

Murders

.406
(3.41)

Publicity

1

Murders

-.364
(5.32)

Publicity

53.7611
.516

_5

* tscore in parentheses.

A. SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS
We conducted several supplemental analyses to ensure that our
original findings remained robust across different specifications. First,
when a ratio measure was used to measure execution risk, the powerful
negative effect of murder incidents on execution risk remained robust.
Second, when the frequency of front-page news stories was used as our
measure of execution newspaper publicity, results remained unchanged.
Third, when we employed murder frequency rather than murder incidents as
our variable of theoretical interest, the vector ARMA results were nearly
identical to those generated in our original analysis. Fourth, following the
practice of other investigators, we coded executions and newspaper
coverage that occurred after the twenty-third of the month as taking place
the following month. This delay represents the time needed for information
about changes in the risk of execution to be disseminated throughout the
population. The results remained virtually the same as those produced
using the unaltered coding scheme in the original analysis.
Fifth, because our data set from the Houston Police Department was
limited to a five-year period, we estimated an ARMA equation between
murder incidents in Houston and statewide executions for a longer ten-year
60 In addition, we ran separate models for each of the execution publicity variables.
Results are virtually identical: both execution stories and execution story length are
inconsequential in determining homicide incident levels. In addition, the frequency of
murder incidents has no effect on the number of execution stories and execution story lines
published per month in the Houston Chronicle. There are also no significant residual
correlations between either of the newspaper publicity variables and murder incidents at the
zero-lag.
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period (1990 to 1999) using the SHR. Although there are a number of
problems with the SHR, we still felt it necessary to compare our results
using the data from the Houston Police Department with the data drawn
from the SHR. The results generated from this analysis, which are reported
in Table 4, are virtually identical to those reported in Table 2. That is, an
increase in the frequency of murder incidents decreases the number of
executions.
No contemporaneous relationship is observed between
statewide executions and murder incidents in Houston.
Table 4
Vector Arma Estimates of the Relationship Between Murder Incidents
(Supplemental Homicide Reports) and Executions, 1990-1994*
Y x 10
02
'1
Murders

Murders

.372

.500

(4.59)

(6.16)

Murders
Executio ns

Executions

.401
4.68)

L-(

Executions

Murders

Executions

.4171

1_(-.240
-2.08)

-

--

-.076

2.011

*t score in parentheses.

Sixth, we extended the time period of our measure of execution
newspaper publicity from 1990 to 1999 and estimated an ARMA equation
between execution publicity and murder incidents in Houston. Again, the
results of this analysis, as reported in Table 5, are nearly identical to the
results displayed in Table 3. We evince no substantive lagged or
contemporaneous relationship between execution newspaper publicity and
murder levels.
Table 5
Vector Arma Estimates of the RelationshipBetween Murder Incidents
(Supplemental Homicide Reports) and Execution Publicity, 1990-1994"

'1
Murders

Murders

.372
(4.67)

Publicityj]PulcL-.007

*t score in parentheses.

Y x 10

0'2

Publicity

Murders

1[

.500

Publicity

Murders

1

Publicity

.423

(6.27)
.031
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Finally and similar to many previous studies, we used the SHR to
estimate an ARMA equation between felony murder incidents in Houston
and statewide executions. We define felony murders as the monthly
number of felony and suspected felony murder incidents. We also included
murder incidents in this measure where the circumstances were unknown.
Although this measure has a number of shortcomings, we still wanted to
compare our results using total murder incidents with those obtained
employing only felony murder incidents. As can be seen in Table 6, we
observe no lagged or contemporaneous relationship between felony murder
incidents and executions. These findings are consistent with prior research
using felony murders derived from the SHR.
Table 6
Vector Arma Estimates of the Relationship Between Felony Murder
Incidents (Supplemental Homicide Reports) and Executions, 1990-1994"
7 x 10
02
01
Murders
Murders

Executions

Executions

Murders

Executions

11.331

.224

.435
(4.91)

(2.53)
.451

Executions

Murders

(5.51)

L

-.170

2.064

• t score in parentheses. Felony murder incidents is defined as the monthly number of felony and
suspected felony murder incidents committed in Houston. Also includes murder incidents where the
circumstances are unknown.

Our failure to evince a relationship may be explained to some degree
by the limited variation in felony murder incidents (mean = 10.96, s.d. =
4.40) as compared to the total number of murder incidents recorded during
the same time period (mean = 28.42, s.d. = 11.90). These figures suggest
that there probably is not a sufficient amount of variation in the felony
murder incident variable to expect even modest effects to emerge in the
ARMA analysis.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

We probed the relations among execution risk, newspaper execution
publicity, and murder incidents. The data used in our primary analyses
encompassed the period from January 1990 to December 1994. We
organized our analysis in terms of several competing theories with respect
to the relationship between capital punishment and murder levels: (1) the
deterrence thesis; (2) the brutalization thesis; (3) the overload thesis; and (4)
public choice theory. The first two of these theories debate the direction of
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the effect between execution risk and murder incidence. The deterrence
thesis predicts that executions attenuate murder rates, whereas the
brutalization thesis argues that executions escalate violence levels in
society. The overload thesis proffers that the certainty of execution declines
as murder levels rise because of finite criminal justice resources. Finally,
public choice theory asserts that high murder rates increase executions
because of public pressure to get tough on crime.
Assuming a recursive causal structure, most research has simply
regressed murder rates on executions and interpreted any relationship as
validating either the deterrence or brutalization thesis. We feel that this
practice is theoretically unjustifiable. There is every reason to believe that
execution risk affects murder incidence as well as being affected by it.
Because of the difficulty in estimating reciprocal effects, we employed a
fully recursive vector ARMA statistical procedure that enabled an
estimation of instantaneous, lagged and feedback effects simultaneously.
The study of the deterrence effects of capital punishment has also been
impeded by difficulties in acquiring murder data at the city level. When
researchers have investigated the effect of executions on murder rates for
states or for the nation as a whole, they have neglected to allow for the
transmission of information relating to punishment risk by local media
outlets and by word-of-mouth, and thus failed to capture the ecological
dynamics that are hypothesized to underlie deterrence theory.
Findings from the vector ARMA analyses fail to lend credence to the
theoretical importance of execution risk and execution newspaper publicity
as factors in determining murder levels. Specifically, we discern no
credible evidence that frequency of execution produces a consequential
decrease in the number of murder incidents in Houston during the period
under investigation. Regardless of the model specified, our analyses show
that both frequency of execution and the newspaper publicity surrounding
an execution have no discernible effect on changes in murder incidents over
time. Additionally, our findings contravene the assertion that executions
devalue human life and legitimize lethal violence since there is no
indication that executions amplify the frequency of murder incidents.
The only persistent finding of the present study is that there is a
negative and delayed effect of murder incidents on execution risk. We are
fully aware that the time period from the occurrence of a homicide to the
execution of an offender is much longer than one month. Our position is
that there already exists a large group of individuals in the system who are
eligible to receive the death penalty. This pool of death eligible offenders is
affected by an increase in murder incidents in such a way so as to slow the
prosecution process and thus ultimately decrease the frequency of
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execution. It is also important for readers to understand that in an
autoregressive ARMA process, such as reported in Tables 2 and 4, the
impact of murder incidents on executions occurs over the entire period of
observation and not only for just one month. However, although murder
incidents impact executions over the entire period of study, its effect
diminishes exponentially over time. That is, the effect of murder incidents
on executions is strongest at lag 1, weaker at lag 2, still weaker at lag 3, and
so forth. Basically, what our ARMA analyses are showing is that murder
incidents have a "ripple" type effect that ultimately reduces the frequency
of execution.
In gauging the validity of our findings we are encouraged by research
that shows how the dramatic rise in the number of death sentences in recent
years has attenuated the certainty of execution. In their comprehensive
study of capital cases nationwide from 1973 to 1995, Liebman et al. found
that "political pressure tends to impel judges-or to create an environment
in which prosecutors and jurors are impelled-to impose death sentences,
but then tends to interfere with the state's capacity to carry out the death
sentences that are imposed.'
However, while the evidence presented here supports the notion that
an increase in murder incidents engenders a reduction in execution
frequency, it does not provide an explanation for that effect. We speculate
that the elaborate appeals process established for capital cases is impeding
the criminal justice system's ability to carry out executions in an efficient
and timely manner. Two specific explanations warrant consideration. First,
we maintain that the direct appeal of capital cases is overwhelming Texas's
ability to expedite habeas corpus petitions, thereby decreasing the frequency
of execution. An interesting and unique feature of capital cases is that in all
states with a death penalty statute (except South Carolina) a death sentence
is appealed automatically to the state's court of last resort, which is usually
the state supreme court. In the state of Texas this court is called the Court
of Criminal Appeals. The review of a direct appeal is mandatory and it
bypasses any intermediate court of appeals.62 Direct appeals of capital
cases only pertain to legal and constitutional errors that may have transpired
during the trial itself such as a ruling made by judge during the trial.
Recent research suggests that the direct appeal of capital cases is
acting as a "bottleneck" in the overall prosecution of capital cases.6 3
Nationally, twenty-one percent of capital sentences imposed between 1973
61

See

LIEBMAN ET AL.,

supra note 46, at 103.

62 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

(2002), availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp01.pdf.
63

See LIEBMAN

ET AL.,

supra note 46, at 43.
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and 1995-about five years worth of death sentences-were awaiting direct
appeal in 1995. In three of the nation's most prolific capital sentencing
states, Texas, Pennsylvania and California, the 1995 log-jam of cases
awaiting state direct appeal encompassed twenty-seven percent, twentyseven percent and forty-seven percent of the state's post-1972 cases,
respectively. It is believed that these direct appeals are placing a significant
burden on state supreme courts to the exclusion of other cases. For
example, Acker and Lanier report that the direct appeal of capital cases
represents a "crushing load" to the California Supreme Court, and that their
volume is jeopardizing the court's ability to perform other necessary
functions. 64 Ueleman also maintains that direct appeals are consuming so
much of the California Supreme Court's time that it "is no longer
functioning as an architect of California case law. It has become chiefly a
death penalty review court."65 It is estimated that the Supreme Courts in
California and Florida spend nearly half of their time reviewing death
66
penalty appeals.
However, while it is readily acknowledged that direct appeals are
slowing the prosecution of capital cases, one has to wonder how direct
appellate review, which occurs relatively early in the prosecution process,
translates into fewer executions being carried out in Texas and other states.
The evidence presented here, which is based on a more sophisticated
analysis than used in previous studies, suggests that the frequency of
homicide has a rather immediate impact on executions. The question that
remains unanswered is why such a quick effect? The most reasonable
answer to this question is that the increased workload engendered by direct
appeals is impeding state supreme courts ability to review the vast number
of habeas corpus petitions that they receive each year. Habeas corpus
appeals are different than direct appeals in that the individual making the
appeal is already on death row awaiting execution. Habeas corpus appeals
also afford defense lawyers the opportunity to broach issues from outside
the trial record, such as allegations of incompetent counsel, suppression of
evidence, and larger constitutional issues. Similar to direct appeals, habeas
corpus petitions are extremely complex and typically require state supreme
courts to review an enormous amount of case related material.

64

James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Statutory Measuresfor More Effective Appellate

Review of Capital Cases, 31 CRiM. L. BULL. 211,233 (1995).
65 Gerald F. Uelmen, Lucas Court: First Year Report, CAL.

LAW. MAG.,

June 1988, at 30-

31.
66 Richard C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What PoliticiansDon 't Say About the High
Costs of the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY OF AMERICA 401 (Hugo Adam Budeau
ed., 1997).
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It is also important to recognize that not only are state supreme courts
reviewing both types of appeals simultaneously, but in Texas, as in most
other states, direct appeals are mandatory and thus given priority over all
other discretionary cases including habeas corpus petitions. It seems likely
that the concurrent review of direct and habeas corpus appeals, coupled
with the preferential treatment shown to direct appeals, inevitably results in
the slowing of executions by lengthening the review time of habeas corpus
appeals. Evidence suggests that the amount of time state supreme courts
are spending in reviewing habeas corpus appeals has increased dramatically
in recent years. From 1990 to 1999, the number of writs of habeas corpus
pending in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals increased by more than
170 percent.67 Approximately seventy percent of these writs were filed by
inmates on death row. In sum, it seems highly likely that the direct appeal
of capital cases is overwhelming the ability of the state supreme courts to
expedite habeas corpus petitions in capital cases, thereby decreasing the
likelihood of execution.
Another plausible explanation for the observed negative relationship
between homicide and frequency of execution relates to prosecutor
workload. We proffer that the pressure to prosecute new capital cases,
which naturally results from an increase in the number of homicides,
reduces the state's ability to retry and re-sentence death row inmates who
had their cases overturned in direct and habeas corpus appeals. Nationally,
the overall rate of serious error in capital cases is approximately sixty-eight
percent while in the state of Texas it is about fifty-two percent. High error
rates in capital cases further slows the system because a finding of serious
error results in vacating the conviction or sentence and the remanding of the
case to the trial court for additional proceedings or retrial. As a result of
retrial or resentencing, a death sentence could be re-imposed and hence the
appellate process begins once again. This elaborate appellate process is
burdensome for prosecutors who are expected not only to prosecute new
capital cases, but also to aid in the preparation of oral arguments at state and
federal appellate review proceedings on capital cases that they prosecuted
previously. The burden of handling the initial prosecution of capital cases
while simultaneously dealing with the retrial or re-sentencing of death row
inmates who had their cases overturned is further compounded by the
typically small number of death eligible prosecutors. In the state of Texas,
for example, only the Chief Prosecutor of the District Court is assigned to
handle capital cases that fall within his or her court's jurisdiction. Chief
prosecutors are assisted by their division chiefs and other senior
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prosecutors. Thus, notwithstanding changes in homicide levels or error
rates in capital cases, the number of prosecutors eligible to handle, capital
cases remains relatively constant over time, at least in the short term.
However, certain caveats must be taken into consideration. First, the
findings reported here must be replicated with other data sets before they
can be accepted without question. The more frequently such research is
conducted, the greater confidence we can place in the generalizability of our
findings to different times and places. The underlying causal mechanisms
for the observed impact of murder incidents on execution risk must also be
dealt with more systematically in future research.
More detailed
information on case processing will allow a more accurate appraisal as to
whether the direct appeal of capital cases is reducing the risk of execution.
Such research will also help provide further evidence bearing on our
interpretation of the murder-execution linkage.
There will also remain a question as to whether the evidence presented
here suffices to sufficiently discredit the deterrence thesis. One possible
limit on the generality of our findings concerns the delineation of the
geographical unit of study. We argued that the city is the most appropriate
unit of analysis for testing the deterrence effects of capital punishment. The
city is an aggregation small enough to be homogenous in reference to
punishment risk, but at the same time still large enough to allow for a
sufficient range of variation in murder incident levels. Even so, this
position requires further empirical verification because it is possible that
even more homogenous geographical units of analysis such as
neighborhoods may be necessary to evince deterrence effects.
It is also conceivable that our inability to discern evidence supporting
the deterrence thesis may be attributable to our reliance on monthly data.
One could make a reasonable argument that murder data should be
calibrated into finer temporal intervals in order to evince a deterrence
effect.68 The influence of the size of time units on causal relationships in
deterrence studies such as ours is a question that requires further
investigation.
In an effort to react to public pressure to get tough on crime,
policymakers have typically sought to increase the severity of criminal
penalties. The use of the death penalty plays a salient role in this endeavor.
From 1973 to 1999 the number of offenders sentenced to death rose by
more than 600 percent. 69 This paper provides bad news for this trend. It
appears that one unintended consequence of death penalty mania has been
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to attenuate the certainty of punishment. The most promising direction for
future research on capital punishment is to pursue the possibility of a
different causal structure than that assumed by either the deterrence thesis
or the brutalization thesis-that high levels of murder decrease the certainty
of execution.
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